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DOES THE SUPREME COURT IGNORE STANDING PROBLEMS
TO REACH THE MERITS?EVIDENCE (OR LACK THEREOF)
FROM THE ROBERTS COURT
HeatherElliott*
TheSupremeCourtisoftenaccusedofusingstandingdoctrinetomanipulateits
docket. Criticsfrequentlyseedismissalsforlackofstandingnotaslegitimatedeci-
sionsaboutjurisdiction(forexample, acorrectdeterminationthataplaintiffsuffered
nocognizableinjury, orthatthesuitseeksnoremedythatwillredressaclaimed
injury), but instead as the Courts avoidance of a sensitive merits decision or even as
biasagainstaparticularclassofplaintiffs.1 So, for example, the Courts recent dis-
missalforlackofstandingofthemarriageequalitycase, Hollingsworth v. Perry,2
seemstobeanefforttoavoidissuingameritsdecisionthatwouldhaveprecluded
furtherpercolationofthemarriageequalityquestionamongthestates.
Ifstandingisamethodofdocketmanipulation, thenwemightalsoexpectthe
Courttofindstandingpresent, despitestandingproblems, whenitwantstoreachthe
meritsofacase. Buttheabsenceofastandingdiscussionisanexampleofmanipula-
tiononlyifthereisnostanding. Manycaseslackstandingdiscussionsbecausesuch
discussionsareunnecessary(standingisobvious);insuchcases, nomanipulationhas
occurred. Inothercases, theabsenceofastandingdiscussionmayinfactreveala
Court ignoring standing to reach the meritsrecent examples include the Affordable
CareActcase, NFIB v. Sebelius,3 andtheaffirmativeactioncase, Fisher v. University
of Texas.4 Ifsuchmanipulationisfoundtobewidespread, itwouldmeanthata
* ProfessorofLaw, TheUniversityofAlabamaSchoolofLaw. ManythankstoRobert
Marshall, Penny Gibson, and Blake Beals of the Law Schools library, who did the vast
majority of the database work. Kudos to Tara Grove, who organized the panel, Standing in
the Roberts Court, for the 2014 Association of American Law Schools AnnualMeeting. I
am gratefulforherinvitationtometoparticipate, herpeerlessmanagementofthedetails,
andtheopportunitytowritethisEssay. ThankstomycopanelistsDickFallon, VickyBanks,
SteveCalabresi, andAnnieWoolhandler, andtoourmoderator, GillianMetzger, forafasci-
natingdiscussion. ThanksespeciallytoFredVars, whogavemeextremelyhelpfulcomments
onamaturedraftofthisEssay.
1 ProfessorPierce, forexample, studiedcasesintheenvironmentalareaanddiscovered
thatfederalappellatejudgesappointedbyRepublicanpresidentsweremuchmorelikelythan
thoseappointedbyDemocraticpresidentstodismissenvironmentalplaintiffsforlackof
standing. RichardJ. Pierce, Jr., Is StandingLawor Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741 (1999).
2 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
3 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
4 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
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majorityofSupremeCourtjusticesareregularlyignoringtheconstitutiontoexer-
cisepowerthattheydonothave.
ToseewhetherthisisacommonstrategyfortheCourt, amoregeneralexamina-
tionofthedocketisrequired. ProfessorStaudt, forexample, tooktheapproachof
lookingatallcaseswithinaparticulararea(taxpayerlawsuits) andconcludedthat
judgessometimesmanipulatestandingdoctrinetoreachfavoredresults, butmuchless
frequentlythantheywereaccused.5
The theme of this panel, Standing in the Roberts Court, presents an excelent op-
portunitytouseadifferentmethodofempiricalanalysis. ChiefJusticeRobertsjoined
theCourtfortheOctoberTerm of2005, andhiseighttermsasChiefofferamanage-
ablesampleofcases(atotalof638 meritsopinions). Moreover, theRobertsCourtis
thecurrent Court, meaningthatconclusionsdrawnfrom thisanalysisarerelevantto
todays litigants. As I discuss below in Part II, I have identified two primary sets of
casesthatwouldpermittheaccusationofmanipulation: caseswheretheCourtad-
dressedstanding, implausiblyfounditpresent, andreachedthemerits(whatI wilcal
theImplausibleCases);andcaseswheretheCourtfailedtodiscussstanding, yetthe
courtorcourtsbelow discussedstandingextensively, suggestingthatstandingwasat
issueinthecase(whatI willcalltheAvoidanceCases).6 Thesecasesareparticularly
worthconsideringbecauseaCourtconcernedaboutitsdignityseemsmorelikelyto
avoidthantoincludeanimplausiblestandinganalysis.
I haveidentifiedonlyonecasethatI findclearlyImplausible. I haveidentified
eighteenAvoidanceCases, whichfallintothreecategories. First, infourteenofthe
cases, thelowercourtsseem tohavegottenthestandingquestionright, andtheCourt
does not need to examine standing any further (though, given the Courts repeated em-
phasisontheimportanceofdeterminingstandingbeforeproceedingtothemerits, one
mightexpecttheCourttodropafootnoteagreeingwiththeanalysis/esbelow). Thus,
althoughthesecasesaretechnicallyAvoidanceCases, theyarenotmanipulative
AvoidanceCases. Second, inthreecases, includingtheNFIB case, standingwasprob-
ablypresent, buttheCourtshouldhaveprovedit;theabsenceofastandingdiscussion
may represent the Courts preference to ignore standing and reach the merits, a mild ex-
ampleofmanipulation.7 Third, and finaly, in only one casethe Fisher casestanding
5 NancyC. Staudt, ModelingStanding, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 612 (2004).
6 Thissamplemaybeunderinclusive. OnemightinsteadlookatallcaseswheretheCourt
failedtodiscussstanding, asdidthecourtsbelow, yettheissuewassufficientlydebatedin
thebriefstosuggestthatallofthecourtsignoredarealstandingproblem. Itisalsopossible
thatthepartiesandthecourtsalloverlookedastandingproblem inordertoreachthemerits.
I concludeas I explain more fully below in Part II.Bthat the alignment of interests that
wouldleadtosuchcasesmaketheseoutcomesunlikely.
7 Theavoidanceofastandingdiscussionmightalsobeanexampleofconstitutional-
questionavoidance. See Ashwanderv. TennesseeValleyAuth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936). But
avoidingastandingquestionwouldpresumablymeanassumingorhypothesizingjurisdiction,
somethingthattheCourtforbadeinSteel Company. See SteelCo. v. CitizensforBetter
Envt, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998).
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wasprobablynotpresent, theabsenceofastandingdiscussionishighlyirregular, and
theCourthasmanipulatedstandingtoreachthemerits.8
Overeightterms, then, onlyonetrulymanipulativeAvoidanceCaseandthree
furthermildAvoidanceCasesgivemeagerevidencethattheCourtdoesinfactignore
standingdoctrinewhenitwishestoreachthemeritsofacase. Whencombinedwith
justonetrulyImplausibleCase, United States v. Windsor,9 themanipulationthesis
(underwhichtheCourtimplausiblyassertsjurisdictionorimproperlyavoidsastand-
ingquestiontoreachthemerits) isnotwellsupportedbythecasesissuedduringthe
RobertsCourt. Thereremainsthequestionofwhethertherearenumerouscaseswhere
theCourtappearstohaveducked themeritsbydismissingforlackofstanding, and
whetherthereisevidenceinothertermsfortheAvoidance, Implausible, andDucking
aspectsofthemanipulationthesis.
***
ThisEssayproceedsinfourParts. InPartI, I review thecasesandliteraturethat
accusetheCourtofusingstandingtomanipulatethedocket. PartII containsadescrip-
tionofthemethodI usedtoassemblethecasesI havestudied. I discusstheImplausible
CasesinPartIII;andI provideananalysisoftheAvoidanceCasesinPartIV.
I. STANDING AS MANIPULATION
Standing doctrine, derived from the words case[] or controvers[y] in Article III
oftheConstitution,10 requiresaplaintifftoshow thatshehassuffered, orwillimmi-
nentlysuffer, aninjuryinfact;thatthisinjuryisatleastpartlytraceabletotheactions
ofthedefendant;andthatajudgmentfrom thecourtwillredresstheinjury, atleastin
part.11 Standingisathresholdrequirementforsubject-matterjurisdiction, andthe
8 Fisher, 132 S. Ct. at2411.
9 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
10 Scholars debate whether the standing doctrine is consistent with the Founders under-
standingofArticleIII. Compare, e.g., RobertJ. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation
of Powers:A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELLL. REV. 393, 478 (1996) ([T]he Court
has properly emphasized that the Founders conception of separation of powers reflected
their common understanding about the nature of legislative, executive, and judicial power.
The law of standing, however, frustrates this shared understanding. (footnote omitted)), with
AnnWoolhandler& CalebNelson, Does History Defeat StandingDoctrine?, 102 MICH. L.
REV. 689, 691 (2004) (We . . . argue that history does not defeat standingdoctrine;thenotion
ofstandingisnotaninnovation, anditsconstitutionalizationdoesnotcontradictasettledhis-
torical consensus about the Constitutions meaning.).
11 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 56061 (1992). This test for constitu-
tional standing under Article III is distinct from the question of prudential standing, which
askswhetherapartywhohas constitutionalstandingisfurtherauthorizedbytherelevant
meritsstatutetoproceed. See, e.g., Assn of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150 (1970). Prudentialstandingisbeyondthescopeofthisdiscussion.
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Courthas, forseveraldecades, emphasizeditsroleinmaintainingtheconstitutional
separationofpowers.12 A caseinwhichnopartyhasstandingtoproceedmustbedis-
missed, theCourtemphasized, becausethereisnoconstitutionalauthoritytoproceed.
Despitetheworkofsignificantdefenders,13 thedoctrineiswidelycriticized.14 It
has been called incoherent,15 filled with doctrinal confusion,16 permeated with
sophistry,17 lackingahistoricalbasis,18 and a[] . . . pointless constraint on courts.19
The Court itself has noted that [s]tanding has been called one of the most amorphous
[concepts] in the entire domain of public law,20 in part because the words cases and
12 [S]tanding is built on a single basic ideathe idea of separation of powers. Allen
v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984). Somescholarshavelaudedthisfunctionofstanding.
StevenG. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L.REV.
23, 5657 (1994) (suggesting that standing plays an important role in reining in the threat
posed by the tenured and unaccountable Article III Executive of the federal courts and the
public interest bar). Others have criticized it. See GillianMetzger, The Interdependent
Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423, 438
(2009) (criticizing jurisdictional barriers that limit [the courts] ability to review Executive
Branch actions). For an argument that standing doctrine is ill-suited for serving separation
ofpowersgoals, seeHeatherEliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459 (2008).
13 See, e.g., MAXWELL L. STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: A SOCIAL CHOICE
ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 282 (2000) (arguingthat, givenstare
decisisandtheexistenceofpublicchoiceproblemswithCourtvoting, standinghelpsthe
Courtmanagetheflowofcasesthatcreateprecedent);StevenG. Calabresi, The Congressional
Roots of Judicial Activism, 20 J.L. & POL. 577, 590 (2004) (recommendingthatCongress
codifyLujans standing doctrine to strengthen the case or controversy limitations on judicial
activism); Tara Leigh Grove, Standingas an Article II Nondelegation Doctrine, 11 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 781, 784 (2009) (notingthatinsuitsagainstprivateindividuals, orinwhichthereal
party in interest is a private individual, standing doctrine protects individual liberty by shield-
ingprivatepartiesfrom arbitraryexercisesof private prosecutorial discretion); Robert J.
Pushaw, Jr., LimitingArticle III Standingto Accidental Plaintiffs: Lessons from Environ-
mental and Animal LawCases, 45 GA. L. REV. 1, 82105 (2010) (arguing that standing plays
animportantroleinkeepingcasesthathavebeenmanufacturedbywould-beplaintiffsout
ofthefederalcourts).
14 E.g., RichardH. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation:
Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1516 (1984) (Regrettably, it
haslongsincebecomecommonplacetobeginanydiscussionofthedoctrineofstandingby
decryingtheconfusionwhichpersistsinthisareaofthelaw. Thisconventionalintroduction
remains appropriate today. (internal citations omitted)).
15 William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 221 (1988).
16 CassR. Sunstein, Standingand the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1432, 1458 (1988).
17 4 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §24.35 (2ded. 1983).
18 See, e.g., StevenL. Winter, The Metaphor of Standingand the Problem of Self-
Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 141825 (1988).
19 JonathanR. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 73, 75 (2007).
20 Flastv.Cohen,392 U.S.83,99 (1968) (quotingHearingson S. 2097Before the Subcomm.
on Constitutional Rights of the S. Judiciary Comm., 89thCong. 498 (1966) (statementof
ProfessorPaulA. Freund)).
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controversies have an iceberg quality, containing beneath their surface simplicity
submerged complexities.21
Moreproblematic, criticsdescribedenialsofstandingasmeritsdecisionscos-
tumedasthresholdjurisdictionalinquiries,22 ornormativedecisionsabouttheproper
scopeofgovernmentactionhiddenwithintechnicaljurisdictionallanguage.23 Anumber
ofscholarshavesaidthatstandingdoctrineisaform ofsubstantivedueprocess,24 re-
flecting the Courts importation of its own values into a mere phrase (here, case[ or]
controvers[y]) in the Constitution.25 Suchcriticismsarenotlimitedtotheacademy.
MembersoftheCourtitself, indissent, haveaccusedmajoritiesofusingstanding
as a cover,26 and have called the doctrine a word game played by secret rules.27
TheselatercriticismsaccusetheCourtofusingstandingtomanipulateitsmerits
docket.28 Standingmaybedistortedtopermitacourttoavoidacase, asJusticeHarlan
contended had occurred in a 1976 case: The Courts treatment of injury in fact . . .
threatens that it shal become a catchal for an unarticulated discretion on the part of
this Court to insist that the federal courts decline to adjudicate claims that it prefers
they not hear.29 ProfessorFallonhasnotedthisissueintherealm ofremedy: ifa
courtfearsitsremedymaycosttoomuchorintrudetoomuchonlegislativespending
21 Siegel, supra note19, at78.
22 See, e.g., MarkV. Tushnet, The New Law of Standing:A Plea for Abandonment, 62
CORNELL L. REV. 663, 663 (1977).
23 See, e.g., GeneR. Nichol, Jr., RethinkingStanding, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 68, 70 (1984);
GeneR. Nichol, Jr., Standingfor Privilege:The Failure of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L. REV.
301, 305 (2002).
24 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note16, at1480;see also Fletcher, supra note15, at233;
CassR. Sunstein, Whats Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, Injuries, and Article III,
91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 167 (1992).
25 Cf., e.g., HerbertHovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process, 40
STAN. L. REV. 379, 380 (1988).
26 Allenv. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 767 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
27 Flastv. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 129 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
28 Of course, todays Supreme Court has extensive discretion over the contents of its docket
becauseofthecertiorariprocess. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 12501260. But because of the Rule of
Four, whichprovidesthatcertiorariisgrantedbyavoteoffourjustices, casesmayreachthe
docketoftheCourtovertheobjectionofamajorityofjustices. EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL.,
SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 32328 (9th ed. 2007). Sometimes theCourtdismissesapetition
as improvidently granted, (called DIGging the case), but such an outcome is rare and often
criticized.See, e.g.,LyleDenniston, ArgumentRecap:A Bad Way to Open a Term, SCOTUSBLOG
(Oct. 7, 2013, 1:56 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/10/argument-recap-a-bad-way-to
-open-a-term/(discussingthedisappointingfirstdayoforalargumentforthe2013 Term, in-
volvingacaseultimatelyDIGged). Ifnotdismissed, the case is decided on the meritsunless
theCourtdecidesitlacksjurisdictionunder, forexample, thestandingdoctrine.
29 Simonv. E. Ky. WelfareRightsOrg., 426 U.S. 26, 66 (1976) (quotingPoev. Ullman,
367 U.S. 497, 530 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting));see also Tushnet, supra note22, at664.
See generally Pierce, supra note1.
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prerogatives, itmayresorttoargumentsofjusticiabilitytoavoidthecase.30 Such
avoidanceisthoughttobeespeciallylikelywhenthefederalcourtsconfrontacase
containingacontroversialpoliticalissue.31 (Ofcourse, thereisavastnumberofcases
involvingcontroversialquestionsthattheCourtcannotrejectonstandinggrounds.)32
Atleasttwostudiesgiveempiricalsupporttothethesisthatstandingisusedto
manipulatecourtdecisionsinfavorofthepoliticalorpolicypreferencesofjudges.
Forexample, ProfessorPiercestudiedasetofthirty-threecasesinvolvingenviron-
mental plaintiffs and found that a Republican judge was almost four times as likely
as a Democratic judge to vote to deny an environmental plaintiff standing.33 Professor
StaudtarguesthatjudgesactlessontheirpoliticalbeliefsthanPierceandothershave
suggested, inpartduetoflawsinthosestudies,34 butneverthelessfinds, afterreviewing
almost700 taxpayerstandingcasesinastatisticalstudyconstructedtoremedythose
flaws, thatthemorescopejudgeshaveforengaginginpoliticalymotivatedstanding
decisions, themorelikelysuchdecisionsare.35
30 See generally RichardH. Falon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies
and Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633 (2006).
31 Forexample, inAllen v. Wright, theCourtrejected, onstandinggrounds, aclaim that
theIRS hadfailedtoenforcenondiscriminationregulationsagainstpurportedlytax-exempt
schools. Allen, 468 U.S. at 74748 & n.16. The political facts behind Allen suggestthatthe
Courtmayhavebeenseekingtoavoidabattlewiththeotherbranches. See id. Thus, thestanding
doctrine does not usefully sort cases into controversial and uncontroversial categories
a point which the Court has, in the past, recognized: [t]he fundamental aspect of standing is
thatitfocuses on the party seekingtogethiscomplaintbeforeafederalcourtandnot on the
issues he wishes to have adjudicated. Flast, 392 U.S. at99 (emphasisadded). Otherdoctrines
exist to sort issues suitable for judicial resolution: [A] party may have standing in a particular
case, butthefederalcourtmayneverthelessdeclinetopassonthemeritsofthecasebecause,
for example, it presents a political question. Id. at100.
32 E.g., Gonzalesv. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (filingbyawomanprosecutedforpossessing
homegrownmedicalmarijuana);Lawrencev. Texas,539U.S.558 (2003) (filingbymenarrested
forhomosexualsodomy);see also Siegel, supra note 19, at 96 ([T]he justiciability doctrines,
evenifstringentlyenforced, stilleaveindividualsempoweredtolitigatelawsuits. . . thataffect
all of society.).
33 Pierce, supra note1, at1760.
34 See Staudt, supra note 5, at 61415.
35 ProfessorStaudtfindsthatifprecedentisvague, orifadecisionislikelytoreceivelittle
scrutinyfrom ahighercourt, judgesindulgetheirpoliticalpreferences:
[D]istrictcourtsaresubjecttoahighlevelofoversightandmonitoring,
andthisworksasapowerfuldeterrenttopoliticaldecisionmaking. . . . In
situationsinwhichtheappelatejudgesarereasonablysuretheSupreme
Courtwilnotreviewtheirdecisions, theywillpursuetheirownpolitical
preferencesirrespectiveoftheexistinglegalprecedent. . . . [T]heSupreme
CourtJustices, withlittleoversightorinstitutionalconstraintstoinhibit
them, makedecisionsthatreflecttheirsincerepolicypreferencesincer-
tain contexts but engage in more strategic decisionmaking in othersall
inanefforttoensuretheygettheirfavoredoutcome.
Id. at669.
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Accusationsofmanipulationareeasytomakewhenacourtdenies standingina
caseandthusrefusestoreachthemerits. Almostanycasewhereanenvironmentalor
civil-rightsplaintiffisdeniedstandingleadstofamiliarcomplaintsthatthestanding
doctrineisbeingabused. EventheSupremeCourt, whichhasvirtuallycompletedis-
cretionindeterminingthecasesthatithears, hasbeenaccusedofusingstandingto
getridofcasesthatthemajoritywisheshadnotbeentakenoncertiorari.36
Presumably, ifcourtsmanipulatestandingtoavoid themerits, theymightalso
doittoreach themerits: theyfindstandingpresentincaseswheretheyactually
shouldfindjurisdictionlacking, inordertoissueanopiniononthemerits. AsI show
inPartII, I haveattemptedtoidentifythecasesoftheRobertsCourtwherestanding
mighthavebeenmanipulatedtoallow theCourttoreach themerits.
II. FINDING IMPLAUSIBLE AND AVOIDANCE CASES
One might distribute cases along a spectrum from standing to no standing as
follows (I use the singular plaintiff for simplicitys sake, but of course many cases
havemultipleplaintiffsorinvolvethestandingofdefendantsonappeal):
A. Cases where no one would question the plaintiffs standing (as in a suit
claimingdamagesfrom acaraccidentthatcausedsevereinjuriestothe
plaintiff);
B. Cases where the issue of the plaintiffs standing might be raised, but
precedentmakesclearitsexistence(asinacitizensuitforpollutionvio-
lationsundertheCleanWaterActbyaplaintiffwhoregularlyboatsand
fishesintherelevantbodyofwater);
C. Cases where the issue of the plaintiffs standing is raised and seriously
debated, andtheoutcome, whateveritis, remainsdebatable;
D. Cases where the issue of the plaintiffs standing is raised because prece-
dentshowsthatitalmostcertainlyislacking(asinasuitbyafederal
taxpayeragainstfederalspendingthatthetaxpayerallegesviolatesany
constitutionalprovisionotherthantheEstablishmentClause);
E. Caseswherenoonewouldthinkthattheplaintiffhadstanding(when
the plaintiff is non-Hohfeldiana pure private attorney general37).
Topresenttheideagraphically:
A B C D E
Standing Standing
clearlypresent clearlyabsent
36 See supra note28.
37 See LouisL. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions:The Non-Hohfeldian or
Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1033 (1968).
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A courtthatengagedinastandinganalysisandthendeniedstandinginan
A orB case, orfoundstandingpresentinaD orE case, wouldbemanipulatingthe
standinganalysistoachievesomeexternalgoal(avoidingameritsquestionthatit
realyshouldaddress, orreachingameritsquestionthatitrealylacksjurisdictionto
hear). Theformercases(denyingstandinginanA orB case) arebeyondthescope
ofthisEssay;thelattercases(findingstandinginaD orE case) arewhatI call
ImplausibleCases.38
A courtcouldalsomanipulatestandingbyignoringit. A courtthatfailed
toengageinanystandinganalysiswhatever, whenthecaseisaC, D, orE case, is
ignoringanobviousquestionaboutitssubject-matterjurisdiction, aquestionitmust
address(suasponte, ifnecessary) beforeproceedingtothemerits. I callthesecases
AvoidanceCases.
A. Implausible Cases
We39 ranasearchoftheWestlaw SupremeCourtdatabasefortheterm
(standing /40 article iii art. 3 article 3 art. III injur! trace!caus!redress!) on
theassumptionthatanycaseengaginginastandinganalysiswouldbefoundbythat
search. Thesearchwasdate-limitedtotheRobertsCourtanditfoundfifty-ninecases
asofMarch21, 2014. Thissearchfoundsomecaseswherethemajoritydidnot discuss
standing, butadissentingjusticedid, andI reclassifiedthoseaspotentialAvoidance
Cases. I theneliminatedanyfalsepositives(caseswhere, despitethelimitationsinthe
search term, standing was used in its nonjurisdictional sense),40 anycaseswhere
therealissuewasprudentialstanding,41 anycaseswherethestandingdiscussionwas
realyasideissue,42 andanycasesinwhichtheCourtdidnotreachthemerits.43 I then
38 A courtthatsquarelyfacesthestandingissuesinaC casecannotfairlybeaccusedof
manipulation, becausetheoutcomeisdebatable. Suchacourtmay, ofcourse, beinfluenced
bypoliticsandpolicypreferencesinhow itdecidesthestandingquestion;itmayeventiltto-
ward or away from finding standing depending on the judges views of the merits. But unless
thestandinganalysisisbogus, thecaseisbesttreatedaswhatC casesgenerallyare: hardcases
understandingdoctrine, andnotinstancesofmanipulation.
39 I relied heavily on the University of Alabamas excellent law librarians for identifying
theuniverseofcasesthatI thenanalyzed.
40 E.g., Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3, 4 (2013) (Sims herself was standingbehindthe
gatewhenitflewopen. TheswinginggatestruckSims, cuttingherforeheadandinjuringher
shoulder. (emphasis added)); see also Floridav. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1425 (2013).
41 Match-E-Be-Nash-She-WishBandofPottawatomiIndiansv. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199,
2210 (2012);Bondv. UnitedStates, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011);Thompsonv. N. Am. Stainless,
LP., 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011);HemiGrp., LLC v. CityofNewYork, 559 U.S. 1 (2010). Asnoted
above, seesupra note11, prudentialstandingisnotthesameasArticleIII standingandis
beyondthescopeofthisEssay.
42 E.g., Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2434 n.10 (2011); Nevada Commn on
Ethicsv. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2011).
43 ThiscategoryincludescaseswhereanotherthresholdissuepreventedtheCourtfrom
reachingthemerits, see, e.g., Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 202930 (2011) (finding
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readtheremainingcasesandidentifiedthosethatI believedreflectedanefforttoover-
comeseriousstandingproblemsinordertoreachthemerits. Thatdeterminationis, of
course, subjective.
B. Avoidance Cases
Suspectingthatitwouldbeeasiertoworkforward(from appellatecasesdis-
cussingstandingthatthenwentuptotheSupremeCourtoncertiorari) thanbackward
(lookingateverynonstandingSupremeCourtcasetoseeifstandinghadbeenanissue
below), weranasearchintheWestlawdatabaseoffederal44 appellatedecisions. The
searchwaslimitedtoreportedcases45 afterJanuary1, 2001 (adaterangethatwas, we
hoped, overinclusive, tocapturecasesthatwereinthepipelineleadingtopotential
certiorari in the Roberts Court) that satisfied the search term (standing /40 article ii
art. 3 article 3 art. III injur!trace!caus!redress!).
Wethenidentifiedthecasesthatweresubjecttoagrantofcertioraribythe
RobertsCourt. Weeliminatedanycasesthathadasubstantialdiscussionofstanding
(becausecaseswithsuchdiscussionsare, bydefinition, notAvoidanceCases). Ifthere
wasaquestionaboutwhetherthediscussionwassubstantial, thecasewaskeptin
thepool. Thisproducedagroupofthirty-fivecases. I theneliminatedanyfalseposi-
tives (as above, cases where standing was used in its nonjurisdictional sense),46
caseswheretheCourtdidnotissueameritsopinion,47 andanycasesinvolvingsolely
prudentialstanding.48
Asnotedabove,49 afew caseswefoundinthesearchforImplausibleCases
werereclassifiedasAvoidanceCasesbecausethemajorityignoredstandingwhile
thedissentmentionedit.
standingpresentbutfindingcasemoot), andcaseswherestandingwasdenied. Thislatter
categoryincludesseveralnotablestandingdecisions. E.g., Hollingsworthv. Perry, 133 S. Ct.
2652 (2013) (denyingstandingtoappealdecision striking down Californias constitutional
ban on marriage between same-sex couples); Clapper v. Amnesty Intl, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013)
(denyingstandingtochallengeallegedlyillegalwiretappingbytheU.S. government);see
also UniteHereLocal355 v. Mulhal, 134 S. Ct. 594 (2013) (dismissingwritofcertiorarias
improvidentlygranted, withJusticeBreyerdissentingandnotingthatbothmootnessand
standingproblemshadcausedtheCourttodismiss).
44 BecausestatecourtsarenotboundbyArticleIII, seeASARCO v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605
(1989), asearchofstate-courtcasesismuchlesslikelytobeproductive. However, thesearch
willbedoneinafutureexpandedversionofthisEssay.
45 A subsequentreview ofSupremeCourtcasesinwhichtheunderlyingopinionswere
unreported addednocasesrequiringdiscussionhere.
46 UnitedStatesv. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
47 Ind. StatePolicePensionTrustv. ChryslerLLC, 556 U.S. 960 (2009).
48 Asdiscussedabove, seesupra note10, prudentialstandingisbeyondthescopeofthis
Essay. E.g., Unitherm FoodSys. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394 (2006).
49 See supra PartII.A.
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Thisresultedinagroupofeighteencases. I thenreadthestandingdiscussions
inthelowercourtsandthemeritsopinionsfrom theCourtitselftodeterminewhether
theSupremeCourtwasduckingastandingissueinordertoreachthemerits. That
analysiswas, ofcourse, subjective.
Othersearchesthatcouldexpandthisuniversewillbepursuedinafuture
project. I intendtorepeatthisprocessinthedistrictcourtdatabasetolookforcasesin
whichthedistrictcourtaddressedstandingbuttheintermediateappellatecourtdidnot,
andtheSupremeCourtsubsequentlygrantedcertiorarianddidnotaddressstanding.
OnecouldalsoseekcasesinwhichthepetitionersandrespondentsbeforetheSupreme
CourtmadestandingargumentsintheirbriefsbuttheCourtdoesnotaddressthem.
Anotherpossibleexpansionofthesearchwouldbetotrytofindcaseswhere
thepartiesvigorouslydebatedstandingbutthelowercourtsdidnotaddressit. I have
noplanstopursuethisavenueinthisorafutureprojectbecauseitisvirtuallyboiler-
plateincontemporarylitigationtochalengethestandingoftheplaintiff, atleastwhere
suchachalengecancolorablybemade. Thepayoffofsuchasearchwouldseem small.
Naturally, themostmanipulativeofAvoidanceCaseswouldbeonewhere
everyoneal the parties, al the judges, and all the amicicoluded to ignore a stand-
ingproblem. Suchacasewouldnotbepickedupbyanysearch, becausestandingwas
notdiscussedinanyofthereportedcases. Theonlyconceivablewaytoidentifysuch
caseswouldbetoreadeverySupremeCourtcaseforthelasteightterms, including
thefullrecordbelow, tryingtodecideifahiddenstandingissuewaslurking. I have
decidedagainstthisapproachbecause, givenouradversarialsystem andgiventhe
diversityofjudgesonthebench, I findithighlyimprobablethatanysuchcasecould
makeitallthewaytoaSupremeCourtjudgmentwithoutsomeone mentioningthe
standingproblem.50
III. THE IMPLAUSIBLE CASES
Thevastmajorityofthecasesfoundunderthissearchwereuncontroversial:
the Court either mentions standing solely as part of describing the lower courts
decisions,51 orsimplytonotethatstandingisobvious.52 Othercasescertainlyinvolve
controversialissues, butthestandingdecisionitselfseemshardtoarguewith.53 Other
50 Inafutureexpandedversionofthisproject, I plantoanalyzearandom sampleofcases
toseeifI findanycasesthatdisprovetheseassumptions.
51 E.g., Assn for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2114
(2013).
52 FreeEnter. Fundv. PublicCo. AccountingOversightBd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3163 n.12
(2010);StoptheBeachRenourishment, Inc. v. FloridaDept. ofEnvtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702,
729 n.10 (2010);Hornev. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 445 (2009).
53 E.g., Salazarv. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1815 (2010) (findingthattheUnitedStateshad
waived its challenge to Buonos standing by failing to appeal in an earlier case and found
standing in the instant case based on the existing injunction granted in the earlier case: Based
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casesinvolvedastandingissuethatcertainlycouldhavebeendecidedeitherway,
but the Courts decision seems entirely plausible. For example, in Monsanto Co. v.
Geertson Seed Farms,54 theCourtfoundstandingforconventionalalfalfagrowersto
challengethereleaseofageneticallyalteredalfalfaplant;standingwaspremisedon
theadditionalcoststhefarmerswouldhavetoincurintestingtheircropsforgenetic
contamination.55 Whilequestionscertainlycouldberaisedabouttheimminenceofthe
risk faced by the farmers, the Courts decision finding standing is not implausible.
Somecritics56 certainlywouldfindMassachusetts v. EPA57 andAEP v.
Connecticut58 implausiblefortheirstandingconclusions, butI donot. Intheformer
case, the Supreme Court addressed the EPAs authority to regulate greenhouse gases
relatedtoglobalclimatechangeafterfindingthatMassachusetshadstandingtosue.59
Thestatehadshownthatitwaslosingshorelineonaccountoftherisingsealevels
caused by global warming. Because the Commonwealth owns a substantial portion
of the states coastal property, it has alleged a particularized injury in its capacity as
alandowner. . . . Remediationcostsalone, petitionersallege, couldrunwellintothe
hundredsofmillions of dollars.60 Thiskindofeconomicharm is, ofcourse, atthe
coreofinjuryinfact.61
Admittedly, thecausationandredressabilityaspectsofthecaseweremore
complicated: theregulationsatissuewouldcontrolonlyasmalcategoryofemissions,
andgasesemitedfrom ChinaandIndiawerelikelytoswampanyeffectthattheU.S.
regulationswouldhave.62 Butthemajorityrespondedplausibly: themajorityheldthat
ArticleIII hasneverrequiredcomplete redress, thatthefederalgovernmentshouldbe
freetotakeanincrementalapproach, andthatthefederalregulation, ifimplemented,
wouldcertainlyslow theprocessofglobalwarming.63 I thusfindthestandinganalysis
withintheboundsofplausibility.64
on the rights he obtained under the earlier decreeagainst the same party, regarding the same
cross and the same landhis interests in doing so were sufficiently personal and concrete to
support his standing.).
54 561 U.S. 139 (2010).
55 Id. at140.
56 See, e.g., RonaldA. Cass, Massachusettsv. EPA:The Inconvenient Truth About
Precedent, 93 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 75 (2007).
57 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
58 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
59 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 50405.
60 Id. at523 (internalcitationsomitted).
61 See, e.g., DanversMotorCo. v. FordMotorCo., 432 F.3d286, 291 (3dCir. 2005)
(While it is difficult to reduce injury-in-fact to a simple formula, economic injury is one of
its paradigmatic forms.).
62 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 54247 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
63 Id. at 52325.
64 Cf. AmyJ. Wildermuth& LincolnL. Davies, Standing, on Appeal, 2010 U. ILL. L.
REV. 957, 959 (arguingthattheproblem withMassachusetts v. EPA isnottheconclusionthe
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I acknowledgethatthecaseiscontroversial, however. Itisburdenedwith
alengthydiscussionofstatesovereigntythatultimatelyhasnothingtodowiththe
actualstandinganalysis,65 whichissuspicious. Moreover, thesamejusticeswhofound
standing also clearly wanted to reverse the Bush Administrations refusal to assert regu-
latoryauthorityovergreenhousegases. Thiscasecouldthusbeseenasanexample
ofquasi-manipulation, wherejusticeswhowantedtoreachthemeritsallowedthat
desiretoinfluencetheirstandingconclusion. Nevertheless, I findthestandinganalysis
fairlystraightforwardandthusdonotcategorizethiscaseasImplausible.
InAEP v. Connecticut,66 theCourtaddressedthesamestandingissue, dividing
evenly(withJusticeSotomayorrecused) overwhetherseveralstates, New YorkCity,
andsomenon-profitshadstandingtobringanuisancesuitunderfederalcommonlaw
againstelectricalgeneratingplantsthatemitedgreenhousegases.67 BecausetheCourt
was evenly divided, the lower courts finding of standing provided the governing law,
andtheCourtwentontothemerits.68 Evenifthemajorityhadreceivedafifthvotefor
standing(whichJusticeSotomayorwaslikelytohaveprovidedifnotrecused), thecase
doesnotseem anobviousexampleofmanipulation: itinvolvedthequestionwhether
thefederalenvironmentallawspreemptedthefederalcommon-law nuisanceaction,
andtheCourtfoundthatitdid.69 Environmentaliststhe constituency most associated
with broad standingwould have strongly preferred the opposite conclusion. I thus
concludethatthiscaseisnotevenquasi-manipulativeandcertainlynotImplausible.
ThecaseI dofindImplausibleisUnited States v. Windsor,70 notforitsstand-
inganalysisinisolation, butforitsstandinganalysiscomparedtoHollingsworth v.
Perry.71 TounderstandmyconclusionI mustfirstlayouteachcase.72
EdithWindsor, whosurvivedherwifeTheaSpeyer, hadtopay$363,000
more in taxes after Speyers death than a widow of a man would have paid, because
thefederalDefenseofMarriageAct(DOMA) didnotrecognizetheWindsor-Speyer
marriage.73 WindsorchallengedDOMA underthefederalConstitutionandtheUnited
States(speakingthroughtheDepartmentofJustice) agreedwithher. Ratherthansim-
plyrefusingtoenforcewhatitsaw asanunconstitutionallaw, however, theUnited
Statespursuedthelawsuitthroughthefederalcourtstoobtainacourtdetermination
Courtreached, butthefactthatthefactualstandinganalysiswasconductedforthefirsttime
onappeal, infrontofjudgeswhoknow nothingaboutfact-gathering).
65 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 51820. The discussion is likely included to gain
Justice Kennedys vote (making five Justices inthemajoritytofindstandingpresent).
66 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2011).
67 Id.
68 Id. at2535.
69 Id. at2537.
70 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
71 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
72 Foramorelengthydiscussionofbothcases, seeHeatherElliott, Further Standing
Lessons, 89 IND. L.J. SUPPLEMENT 17 (2014).
73 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at2679.
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thatDOMA wasunconstitutional.74 TheCourtdecidedthat, becauseWindsorhadwon
below andwasseekingtoenforcethe$363,000 judgment, andbecausetheUnited
Stateswouldbeharmedbypayingthatmoney, ArticleIII standingwassatisfied.75
Thelackofadversityraisedaprudential, butnotjurisdictionalconcern, andthepru-
dentialworrieswereovercomebecauseanintervenor(theBipartisanLegalAdvisory
GroupoftheHouseofRepresentatives) wasdefendingDOMA ratherthantheUnited
States.76 ThustheCourthadArticleIII jurisdictionoverthedisputeandproceededto
findDOMA unconstitutional.77
InHollingsworth, twogaycouplesbroughtafederalconstitutionalchalenge
to Californias constitutional ban on marriage between those of the same sex, a ban
addedtotheCaliforniaConstitutionbyballotinitiative.78 AsinWindsor, thegovern-
ment officials (then-Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and thenAttorney General
JerryBrown) agreedwiththeplaintiffsthatthelaw wasunconstitutional.79 Asin
Windsor, intervenors(theproponentsoftheoriginalballotinitiative) participatedto
defendthelaw. DespitethestrongsimilaritieswithWindsor, despitethestrongclaim
that standing for the intervenors was necessary to vindicate the workings of Californias
initiativesystem, anddespitethefactthatatleastonejusticethoughtstandingin
Hollingsworth wasmore obviousthaninWindsor,80 theCourtfoundtheappellants
lackedstanding.81 TheCourtfoundthattheintervenorshadnotsufferedtheindivid-
ualizedharm sufficienttojustifyArticleIII standing,82 andthatCaliforniahadnot
appointedthem asagents(inthetraditionalprincipal-agentsense).83
Individually, thesecasesmaymakesomesense. Afterall, BLAG isdifferent
from theCaliforniainitiativeproponents, andatax-refundorderisdifferentfrom an
injunctionagainstenforcementofastateconstitutionalban. However, itishardtore-
sisttheconclusionthattheCourtwasmanipulatingstandingtoproducethepolitical
74 ForanexcellentdiscussionofwhethertheExecutiveBranchevenhastheauthorityto
pursuesuchalawsuit, seeTaraLeighGrove, StandingOutside Article III, 162 U.PA. L.REV.
1311 (concludingitdoesnothavesuchauthority).
75 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at2686.
76 Id. at2688.
77 Id. at2696.
78 See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 265960 (2013).
79 Id. at2656.
80 Windsor, 133 U.S. at 2712 (Alito, J., dissenting) (Whether [BLAG] has standing to peti-
tionisamuchmoredifficultquestion. Itisalsoasignificantlycloserquestionthanwhether
theintervenorsinHollingsworth . . . havestandingtoappeal. ItisremarkablethattheCourt
hassimultaneouslydecidedthattheUnitedStates, whichreceivedallthatithadsoughtbelow,
isaproperpetitionerin[Windsor]butthattheintervenorsinHollingsworth, whorepresent
thepartythatlostinthelowercourt, arenot. Inmyview, boththeHollingsworth intervenors
and BLAG have standing. (internal citations omitted)).
81 Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at2688.
82 Id. at 266263.
83 Id. at 266567.
202 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 23:189
resultitwanted: (1) throughWindsor, DOMA isgone, sothatstateswishingtopro-
videmarriageequalitycannow doso, but(2) throughHollingsworth, theCourthas
issuednoconstitutionalrulingonstatemarriagebans, sothatthestatesarefreetocon-
tinuetheirpoliticalprocesses. Moreover, theargumentsforstandinginHollingsworth
were, I believe, considerablystrongerthanthoseinWindsor.84 ThusI placeWindsor
squarelywithintheImplausiblecategory.
IV. THE AVOIDANCE CASES
I concludethatfourteenoftheeighteenAvoidanceCasesshow noevidence
of manipulation, but instead are cases where the Courts lack of standing discussion
isperfectlyinnocent;theremainingfourcasesdeserveanaccusationofmanipula-
tion, thoughonlyone(Fisher) isstronglymanipulative. I dividethecasesintothree
categories: fourteencaseswherethelackofstandinganalysisisinnocent;threecases
wherethestandingquestionwascloseenoughthattheCourtshouldhavediscussedit,
even if it agreed with the lower courts standing determination; and one case, Fisher,
wheretheCourtfailedtodiscussstandingeventhoughitwasprobablylacking.
A. Cases Where StandingWas Almost Certainly Present and It Is Unsurprising
That the Court Did Not Discuss It
FourteenoftheAvoidanceCasesdonotinvolvemanipulation.85 Theywere
includedasAvoidanceCasesbecausethecourtsbelow raisedandresolvedastanding
issue, andtheCourtsubsequentlyaddressedthemeritswithnoreferencetothestand-
ingquestion. However, thesethirteencasesareA andB casesonthespectrum pro-
videdabove.86 Forexample, inRicci v. DeStefano,87 acasewhereseveralwhiteand
oneLatinofirefighterchalengedapromotionexaminationallegingreversediscrimina-
tion, thedistrictcourt(relyingonSecondCircuitprecedent) quicklyfoundstandingfor
theplaintiffs.88 TheSecondCircuitCourtofAppeals, however, didnotevenusethe
84 See supra notes 7083 and accompanying text; see also generally Elliot, supra note72.
85 AgencyforIntern. Dev. v. AllianceforOpenSocietyIntern., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321
(2013); Tarrant Regl Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. 2120 (2013); Assn for Molecular
Pathologyv. MyriadGenetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013);McBurneyv. Young, 133 S. Ct.
1709 (2013);CitizensUnitedv. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010);Ricciv. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557
(2009); Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); Engquist v. Oregon Dept of
Agric., 553 U.S. 591 (2008);Crawfordv. MarionElectionBd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008);Rowev.
N.H. Motor Transp. Assn, 552 U.S. 364 (2008); N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. López
Torres, 552 U.S. 196 (2008); Natl Assn of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551
U.S. 644 (2007); Rockwell Intl Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457 (2007); Wagnon v.
PrairieBandPotawatomiNation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005).
86 See supra notes 3738 and accompanying text.
87 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
88 See Ricciv.Destefano,554F.Supp.2d142, 16061 (Conn. 2006) (finding standing based
onunequaltreatmentbasedonrace(citingComerv. Cisneros,37 F.3d775,791 (2dCir. 1994))).
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wordstanding, muchlessdiscussthepresenceorabsenceofstanding;89 theSupreme
Courtusedthewordstanding, butonlyinnonjurisdictionalsenses.90 TheSupreme
CourtpresumablyfailedtodiscussstandingforthesamereasonthattheSecond
Circuit did: they agreed with the district courts two-sentence reliance on precedent.
Thisseemsuncontroversial. TheCourtneednotaddressstandinginthese
caseswhenthereisnorealquestionwhetherstandingispresent. Itisconceivablethat
theCourtcouldadoptarulethatitalwayshastostatewhystandingispresent, but, as
I discussbelow, thismighthighlighttheproblemsincaseswheretheCourttrulyis
duckingastandingproblem toreachthemerits.91
Eventhemostcontroversialcaseinthisgroup, District of Columbia v. Heller,92
isnotacasethatinvolvedstandingmanipulation. Thiscase, whichfamouslystruck
down portions of D.C.s gun control laws by finding an individual right to bear arms
undertheSecondAmendment,93 involved a serious question regarding standingone
thatimplicatesacircuitsplit, oneonwhichsomepartiessoughtcertiorari, andone
onwhichtheCourtdeniedcertiorari.94 However, oneplaintiffwasunaffectedbythis
split(hehadstandingregardless), andtheCourtcouldreachthemeritswithonlythis
plaintiffasapartybeforeit. Thisisnotmanipulation.
TheonecasethatI thinkisaclosecall, andperhapsfallsinthenextsection
ratherthanthisone, isAgency for International Development v. Alliance for Open
Society International, Inc.95 Thecaseisrelativelycontroversial: itinvolvedtheFirst
Amendmentrightsofnon-governmentalorganizationsfightingHIV/AIDS andother
healthproblemswithfundingundertheUnitedStatesLeadershipAgainstHIV/AIDS,
Tuberculosis, andMalariaActof2003.96 Thecourtsbelow discussedstandingex-
tensively, while the Supreme Courts majority opinion does not even use the word
89 530 F.3d 87 (2d. Cir. 2008) (standing does not appear in the opinion when text
issearched).
90 See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 567, 571, 599 (using the word standing only in the sense of
standing alone or long-standing).
91 See infra Conclusion.
92 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
93 Id. at592.
94 TheRockwell case also featured a petition over the propriety of certain parties ability
to proceed. Rockwell Intl Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457 (2007). However, thequestion
oncertwasnotoneofstanding: itinvolvedwhethertherelatorprovisionsoftheFalseClaims
Act violate Article IIs Appointment and Take Care Clauses. The Court has previously noted
this Article II problem but has not addressed it. Vt. Agency of Natl Res. v. United States ex
rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 778 n.8 (2000) ([W]e express no view on the question whether
qui tam suits violate Article II, in particular the Appointments Clause of § 2 and the take
Care Clause of § 3.). The Court refused to grant cert here, too. Because the Court has pre-
viouslyheldthatqui tam relatorshaveArticleIII standing, however, andbecausethelower
courtsreliedonthisclearlyestablishedprecedent, I conclude that the Supreme Courts failure
todiscussstandingisinnocent.
95 133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013).
96 22 U.S.C. §7601.
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standing. It is thus possible that the majority is avoiding a standing question in
ordertoreachthemeritsofanimportantcase. I haveultimatelyconcluded, however,
that this is not an avoidance case. I am swayed by Justice Scalias dissent, which is
vehementonthemeritsbutwhichdoesnotchallengetheimplicitfindingofstanding
madebythemajority. ItissimplytoolikelythatJusticeScaliawouldhavetakenthe
majoritytotaskforeverymistakeitmade;ifhedoesnotcomplainaboutthefailure
todiscussstanding, thereisprobablynotaproblem.
B. Cases Where StandingWas Probably Present, but It Is Nevertheless
SurprisingThat the Court Did Not Discuss It
ThreeAvoidanceCasesraisedsignificantstandingproblemsthatwerere-
solved in favor of jurisdiction by the intermediate appelate courts; the Courts failure
todiscussstandinginitsreview ofthosecasescouldbeseenasasub silentio agree-
mentwiththelowercourtanalyses.97 I placedthesecasesinthissectionratherthan
theprevioussection, however, becausethestandingquestionswereclose, andoneof
thecases(NFIB) changedinitsstandingpostureafterthelowercourtopinionswere
writen. I thus conclude that, for these Avoidance Cases, the Courts failure to discuss
standinginthesecasesisatleastamildexampleofmanipulation.
Mostnotably, theCourtfailedtodiscussstandinginNFIB v. Sebelius,98 the
challengetothePatientProtectionandAffordableCareAct(PPACA).99 PPACA
(particularly its individual mandate)100 waschallengedinscoresoflawsuits,101 and
standingwasanissueinmanyofthoselawsuits.102 NFIB itselfwasacaseinwhich
the Obama Administration had already conceded the plaintiffs standing (although,
becauseArticleIII isaconstitutional restriction on the federal courts powers, no par-
tiescanconferstandingbyconcession).103 Evenwhenthenamedplaintiffdeclared
bankruptcyandanew plaintiffhadtojointhecase, theAdministrationsupportedthe
motiontosubstitutethatparty.104
97 NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); Natl Aeronautics and Space Admin. v.
Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746 (2011);Randallv. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006).
98 See generally NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at2566.
99 PatientProtectionandAffordableCareAct, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010),
amended by HealthCareandEducationReconciliationActof2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152,
124 Stat. 1029 (2010).
100 AffordableCareAct§1501. Theso-calledindividualmandateistheprovisionof
PPACA that requires most Americanswithexceptionsforthosebelow certainincome
levelsto purchase health insurance or face a penalty.
101 HeatherElliott, StandingLessons:What We Can Learn When Conservative Plaintiffs
Lose Under Article III StandingDoctrine, 87 IND. L.J. 552, 575 n.159 (2012).
102 Id. at 57578.
103 Brief for Appellants at 6 n.1, Florida v. United States Dept of Health & Human Servs.,
648 F.3d1235 (11thCir. 2011) (Nos. 11-11021, 11-11067), 2011 WL 1461593.
104 Brief for Petitioners at 16 n.5, Dept of HHS v. Florida (Jan. 6, 2012) (No. 11-398),
2012 WL 37168. TheGovernmenthadchallengedstandingbelowandatthecertioraristage
butdidnotrenew thoseargumentsaftertheCourthadtakenthecase.
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Despitethisdramasurroundingthestandingoftheleadplaintiff, neitherthe
majoritynorJusticeGinsburginconcurrencementionstheissueofstanding.105 This
omissionissurprising: giventheproblemswithstandingbothbelowandattheSupreme
Court, onewouldexpectatleastabriefdiscussionoftheissue.
ThatthePPACA caseisanAvoidanceCasegivesatleastmildevidencefor
the manipulation thesis. To be sure, a number of factors support the Courts implicit
conclusionthataproperpartywithstandingwaspresent. TheGovernmentconceded
standing, thestandingissueswerefairlyordinary(involvingthecommon-or-garden
varietyofstanding, economicharm), andtheCourthadorderednospecificbriefing
onstanding.106 However, theneedforalast-minutesubstitutionofpartiesmakesclear
thatstandingbeforetheCourtwasnotsimplyamaterofimplicitlyapprovingalower
courts findingsthere had been no lower court findings on that partys standing.
Moreover, themeritsofthecasegiverisetothesuspicionthattheCourtwould
want toreachthemeritsregardlessofstanding. Thecountrywasclamoringforadeci-
siononPPACA, andtheCourtitselfwassplitalongpoliticallinesonhow toresolve
themeritsquestion. Giventhesefacts, andthecommonperceptionthatstandingdoc-
trineismanipulatedsothatcourtscanreachoravoidthemeritsastheychoose,107
theCourtprobablyshouldhaveaddressedthestandingquestion, evenifonlyina
footnote. Itsfailuretodosogivesrisetothesuspicionthat, iftheylookedtoohard,
theywouldfindaproblem withstandingthatwouldprecludeameritsdecision.
C. Cases Where StandingWas Probably Not Present, but the Court Reached the
Merits Anyway, Without Addressingthe StandingQuestion
I haveidentifiedonlyonecaseinwhichtheCourtdoesnotdiscussstanding,
eventhoughthereisthestrongpossibilitythatstandingwaslacking. Thatmeansthat
theCourtmaywellhavelackedsubject-matterjurisdictionandneverthelessreached
themerits. Thisisthestrongcaseofmanipulation, representingtheworstofwhat
scholarshaveaccusedcourtsofdoingwiththestandingdoctrine. ThefactthatI could
findonlyonecaseineightterms, however, showsthatthiskindofstrongmanipulation
israre.
ThiscaseisFisher v. University of Texas.108 The word standing appears no-
where in the Courts opinion, but it had been an issue in the Fifth Circuit (which found
thattheplaintiffshadnostandingtopursueinjunctiverelief)109 andinthebriefs(the
UniversityofTexassuggestedtheplaintiffshadnostandingforanyform ofrelief).110
105 NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). TheChiefJusticedoesaddressonethreshold
jurisdictionalmatter: whethertheAnti-InjunctionActbansthesuit. Id. at 258184.
106 Id.
107 See supra notes 1231 and accompanying text.
108 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
109 Fisherv. UniversityofTexas, 631 F.3d213, 217 (5thCir. 2011).
110 Brief for Respondents at 1617 n.6, Fisher v. University of Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013)
(No. 11-345).
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Onremand, theFifthCircuitaskedforfurtherbriefingonstanding.111 TheUniversity
arguedthatFisherlackedstandingtopursueherclaims.112 Initsultimateremandopin-
ion, theFifthCircuitnoteditsconcernthatFisherlackedstandingbutconcludedthat
the Supreme Courts remand required it to reach the merits.113
SeveralcommentatorshavealreadysuggestedthattheCourtlackedjurisdiction
overthecasebecauseFisherlackedstanding.114 Erwin Chemerinsky cals the Courts
failure to discuss standing and other jurisdictional issues inexplicabl[e].115 Yetthe
Fisher Courts avoidance of standing is explicable if it is manipulative avoidance: the
Courtwantedtoaddressthemeritsofaffirmativeaction, didnotwanttobeprevented
from doingsobyastandingproblem, anddidnotwanttobeembarrassedbywhat
wouldhavebeenanextremelyimplausiblestandinganalysis.
Tobefair, Fisher may reflect less the Courts manipulation to reach the merits
as much as the Courts avoidance of a quagmire. Even if the Court had addressed
standing, itwouldhavebeenfacedwithoneofthemostconfusedareasofstanding
doctrine.116 The Courts affirmative action standing doctrine has long been viewed
asconvolutedandinconsistentwithstandingdoctrinemoregeneraly(and, giventhe
criticismsofstandingdoctrinemoregenerally, thisissayingsomething).117 Itisthus
111 Letterfrom LyleW. Cayce, Clerk, U.S. CourtofAppealsfortheFifthCircuit, to
Counsel, Fisherv. Texas(Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Documents/2013
.9.12.Scheduling.Order.pdf.
112 Supplemental Brief for Appellees at 619, Fisher v. University of Texas, 758 F.3d 633
(5thCir. 2014) (No. 09-50822).
113 Fisher v. University of Texas, 758 F.3d 633, 63841 (5th Cir. 2014) (Fishers . . . scores
were[suchthat]shecouldnothavereceivedanofferofadmissiontotheFall2008 freshman
class. Ifshehadbeenaminoritytheresultwouldhavebeenthesame. Thisrealitytogetherwith
factualdevelopmentssincesummaryjudgmentcallintoquestionwhetherFisherhasstanding.
[B]ut in our view the actions of the Supreme Court do not allow out reconsideration [of Fishers
standing]. TheSupremeCourtdidnotaddresstheissueofstanding, althoughitwassquarely
presented to it. Rather, it remanded the case for a decision on the merits. (footnotes omitted)).
114 E.g., ErwinChemerinsky, The Court Affects All of Us:The Supreme Court Term in
Review, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 361, 363 (2013) (I strongly believe that the Court did not have
jurisdiction to hear the case due to lack of standing, as well as Eleventh Amendment issues);
DanieleHolley-Walker, DefiningRace-Conscious Programs in the FisherEra, 57 HOW.L.J.
545, 55556 (2014) (One issue that has become afocusonrehearing, andmayultimately
impact the outcome of the case, is whether Abigail Fisher has standing to continue . . . .).
115 Chemerinsky, supra note114, at364.
116 See RyanH. Nelson, Injury in Fiction, 66 VAND. L. REV. 153, 16263 (2013).
117 E.g., F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL
L. REV. 275, 304 (2008) (noting that the Court, in the affirmative action context, has recog-
nized injuries that are a far cry from the concrete and palpable injuries that the Court pur-
ports to require); Richard M. Re, Relative Standing, 102 GEO. L.J. 1191, 120102 (2014)
(notingthattheinjuriesacceptedassufficientforstandinginaffirmativeactioncasesarenot
acceptableinothersubstantivecontexts);see also, e.g., AshutoshBhagwat, Injury Without
Harm:Texasv. Lesageand the Strange World of Article III Injuries, 28 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 445, 44851 (2001); Harvard Law Review Association, LeadingCases:Standingto
Challenge Affirmative Action Programs, 107 HARV. L. REV. 144, 30312 (1993).
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possiblethattheCourtwassimplyavoidingaconfrontationwiththerealityofits
affirmativeactionstandingjurisprudence.
Some, however, havecontendedthataffirmativeactionstandingismore
thanconfused: itisintentionally(orunconsciously) warpedtothebenefitofracial
majoritiesandotherprivilegedgroups.118 On this latter view, the Courts failure to
evaluate Fishers standing to sue returns this Avoidance Case into the malign cate-
goryofmanipulation.
I cannothelpbutfindFisher manipulative. TheCourthadmanyoptions: it
couldhavedismissedthecaseasimprovidentlygranted, itcouldhavetakenonthe
standinganalysisandfoundthatFisherlackedstanding, oritcouldhaveengagedin
whatwouldlikelyhavebeenanImplausibleanalysisandproceededtothemerits.
Thatittooknoneofthesepathandinsteaddecidedthemeritswithoutevenarefer-
encetothestandingproblem is, I think, evidenceofthestrong(andreprehensible)
form ofmanipulation.
CONCLUSION
I attemptedtoidentifyeverycaseduringthetenureofChiefJusticeRoberts
inwhichtheCourtshouldhaveaddressedstandingbeforereachingthemeritsbutdid
not, oraddressedstandingandreachedanImplausibleresultonstandinginorderto
reachthemerits. Inthoseeightterms, I identifiedonlyonecasethatI feelstronglyis
Implausible, onlyoneAvoidanceCaseinwhichtheCourtprobablylackedjurisdic-
tiontoissueitsmeritsopinion, andthreefurthermildAvoidanceCases. Thisisavery
smalnumberwhencomparedtothe538 meritsopinionsissuedbytheRobertsCourt.
ThisisnotevidenceuponwhichtobaseanystrongaccusationsthattheCourthas
astrategyofignoringorstretchingArticleIII standingdoctrinewhenitwishesto
reach themeritsofacase.
Themanipulationthesisisthereforenotsupportedbythecasesissuedduring
theRobertsCourt. Thereremainsthequestionofwhethertherearenumerouscases
wheretheCourtappearstohaveducked themeritsbydismissingforlackofstand-
ing, andwhetherthereisevidenceinothertermsfortheAvoidance, Implausible, and
Duckingaspectsofthemanipulationthesis. Thosequestionsareleftforanotherday.
118 GeneR. Nichol, Jr., Standingfor Privilege:The Failure of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L.
REV. 301, 309, 31112 (2002) (arguing that the toughestissueinstandinglawarguablyisdeter-
mining when the injury requirement will be taken seriously and when it will be ignored and
contendingthatitisignoredtothebenefitofwhitechalengersofaffirmativeactionprograms);
ChristianB. Sundquist, The First Principles of Standing:Privilege, System Justification, and
the Predictable Incoherence of Article III, 1 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 119 (2011).
